러시아ㆍ유라시아

Through comparative historical analysis, we find that Russia’s strategic communications regarding nuclear weapons use in Ukraine broadly reflect Soviet strategy during the Cold War. The Soviet Union employed a combination of aggressive and defensive propaganda narratives regarding nuclear weapons; the former aimed to coerce the West away from interfering in Soviet military interventions abroad, while the latter sought to convince international audiences that the West was primarily to blame for escalations in tensions. Russia continues to employ this same strategy to provide protective cover for its ongoing war on Ukraine. In both cases, actual Soviet and Russian nuclear posture remained significantly less bellicose than its propaganda narratives imply. Our analysis suggests that Russia’s aggressive rhetoric about nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine has thus far been primarily intended to shape Western decision-making, rather than a genuine expression of intent to use such weapons. In Ukraine, nuclear ‘red lines’ advanced by Russian propaganda have consistently been eroded without response, including significant strikes on Crimea, advanced weapons supplied to Ukraine, and the re-taking of illegally annexed territory. Nevertheless, Russia’s nuclear propaganda has been one of its most successful cognitive warfare efforts in limiting or delaying critical Western military support to Ukraine, on the grounds of avoiding potential escalation. While Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains a significant threat to Ukraine and the West, an overly cautious response to Russian rhetoric also risks potentially significant geopolitical consequences by tacitly rewarding nuclear threats.